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Oct 5

Running in CIRCLE? A Simple Benchmark for LLM Code Interpreter Security

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 25, 2025 2

SingGuard-NSFA: Extensible Guardrails for Agentic AI via Generative Reasoning and Real-Time Classification

We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion. We first introduce the NSFA taxonomy, which organizes 185 risk variants into a CIA-triad-grounded hierarchy and is cross-validated against three well-established OWASP guidelines. Based on this taxonomy, we construct a benchmark suite spanning 133 languages, comprising over 93K purpose-built samples targeting both user queries and agent responses, along with 3,435 cross-source samples adapted from five public agent-security datasets. To detect these operational threats in practice, we develop a dual-mode approach combining SFT-based generative reasoning for interpretable offline auditing with discriminative classification heads on the frozen backbone, enabling real-time detection at approximately 50,ms. We release four models with 0.8B, 2B, 4B, and 9B parameters, all achieving geq94% F1 on purpose-built benchmarks and surpassing the strongest competing guardrails by 6 to 12 absolute points. On cross-source evaluation, the 9B model attains 91.29% F1 with a more balanced precision--recall trade-off. Moreover, ablation experiments show that classification heads can equip a guardrail with risk detection capabilities beyond its original scope and achieve state-of-the-art performance. These results demonstrate the extensibility of the approach and its generality as a plug-in enhancement.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 12

ClashBench: Conflicts Leading Agents to Seize and Harm

As agent systems become more widely used, multiple agent sessions increasingly run alongside pre-existing user tasks in the same environment, sharing resources with limited capacity or mutually exclusive states. This creates a safety risk: when granted sufficient privileges, an agent may resolve a resource conflict by terminating or otherwise disrupting an existing task rather than reporting it. In this work, we identify and formalize this failure mode, which we term destructive resource preemption: obtaining the resources required for a requested task by terminating, overwriting, evicting, or degrading an incumbent task. To systematically study this risk, we introduce ClashBench, an executable benchmark comprising 268 validated conflict cases across 55 resource types, and evaluate 17 models through Codex, Claude Code, and OpenCode. We observe destructive preemption in 44.5% of trajectories, where the agent completes the requested task while causing the incumbent task to fail its health check. We also show that prompt-based safeguards are insufficient: an instruction to avoid affecting existing tasks reduces but does not eliminate preemption, while an instruction explicitly authorizing the agent to stop local processes increases it. More concerningly, in 31.9% of successful destructive-preemption cases, the final response mentions neither the resource conflict nor the action taken to resolve it, raising concerns about possible concealment. These findings establish destructive resource preemption as a broad safety risk in privileged agent systems and motivate stronger privilege controls, task isolation, and conflict-aware safeguards.

  • 9 authors
·
Sep 16

Golden Hour Divide: Trauma Care Accessibility and Resource Vulnerability in Sri Lanka

Timely intensive care dictates survival, yet emergency infrastructure remains unevenly distributed across Sri Lanka. While pre-hospital services have expanded, the transition to definitive care remains a critical bottleneck. This study evaluates national emergency resilience by quantifying the gap between clinical demand and the availability of specialized resources across all 25 districts. Using the latest national epidemiological data and terrain-aware H3 hexagonal modeling, we analyzed accessibility for seven critical conditions based on spatial gaps, clinical need-gaps, lethality, coverage, and resource availability. Based on these metrics, unsupervised K-Means clustering was applied to categorize districts into four policy-actionable archetypes: Critical Structural Exclusion, Institutional Mirages, Operational Capacity Strain, and High-Resilience Benchmarks. Our study suggests that severe service deficits exist in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where spatial gaps exceed 70%, rendering the Golden Hour operationally impossible. Notably, specialist scarcity drives systemic pressure more than bed capacity; underserved regions effectively function as institutional mirages. This study suggests that improving accessibility by 25% in high-priority clusters would reduce the national need-gap by 9.65%, providing a roadmap for the strategic redistribution of specialists to ensure healthcare equity.

  • 9 authors
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Jul 5