Daily Papers

Despite widespread use of LLMs as conversational agents, evaluations of performance fail to capture a crucial aspect of communication: interpreting language in context -- incorporating its pragmatics. Humans interpret language using beliefs and prior knowledge about the world. For example, we intuitively understand the response "I wore gloves" to the question "Did you leave fingerprints?" as meaning "No". To investigate whether LLMs have the ability to make this type of inference, known as an implicature, we design a simple task and evaluate four categories of widely used state-of-the-art models. We find that, despite only evaluating on utterances that require a binary inference (yes or no), models in three of these categories perform close to random. However, LLMs instruction-tuned at the example-level perform significantly better. These results suggest that certain fine-tuning strategies are far better at inducing pragmatic understanding in models. We present our findings as the starting point for further research into evaluating how LLMs interpret language in context and to drive the development of more pragmatic and useful models of human discourse.

Current large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated emerging capabilities in social intelligence tasks, including implicature resolution (Sravanthi et al. (2024)) and theory-of-mind reasoning (Shapira et al. (2024)), both of which require substantial pragmatic understanding. However, how LLMs acquire this competence throughout the training process remains poorly understood. In this work, we introduce ALTPRAG, a dataset grounded in the pragmatic concept of alternatives, designed to evaluate whether LLMs at different training stages can accurately infer nuanced speaker intentions. Each instance pairs two contextually appropriate but pragmatically distinct continuations, enabling fine-grained assessment of both pragmatic interpretation and contrastive reasoning. We systematically evaluate 22 LLMs across key training stages: pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and preference optimization, to examine the development of pragmatic competence. Our results show that even base models exhibit notable sensitivity to pragmatic cues, which improves consistently with increases in model and data scale. Additionally, SFT and RLHF contribute further gains, particularly in cognitive-pragmatic reasoning. These findings highlight pragmatic competence as an emergent and compositional property of LLM training and offer new insights for aligning models with human communicative norms.

Pragmatic reasoning plays a pivotal role in deciphering implicit meanings that frequently arise in real-life conversations and is essential for the development of communicative social agents. In this paper, we introduce a novel challenge, DiPlomat, aiming at benchmarking machines' capabilities on pragmatic reasoning and situated conversational understanding. Compared with previous works that treat different figurative expressions (e.g. metaphor, sarcasm) as individual tasks, DiPlomat provides a cohesive framework towards general pragmatic understanding. Our dataset is created through the utilization of Amazon Mechanical Turk ( AMT ), resulting in a total of 4, 177 multi-turn dialogues. In conjunction with the dataset, we propose two tasks, Pragmatic Identification and Reasoning (PIR) and Conversational Question Answering (CQA). Experimental results with state-of-the-art (SOTA) neural architectures reveal several significant findings: 1) large language models ( LLMs) exhibit poor performance in tackling this subjective domain; 2) comprehensive comprehension of context emerges as a critical factor for establishing benign human-machine interactions; 3) current models defect in the application of pragmatic reasoning. As a result, we call on more attention to improve the ability of context understanding, reasoning, and implied meaning modeling.

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.

Indirectness is a common feature of daily communication, yet is underexplored in NLP research for both low-resource as well as high-resource languages. Indirect Question Answering (IQA) aims at classifying the polarity of indirect answers. In this paper, we present two multilingual corpora for IQA of varying quality that both cover English, Standard German and Bavarian, a German dialect without standard orthography: InQA+, a small high-quality evaluation dataset with hand-annotated labels, and GenIQA, a larger training dataset, that contains artificial data generated by GPT-4o-mini. We find that IQA is a pragmatically hard task that comes with various challenges, based on several experiment variations with multilingual transformer models (mBERT, XLM-R and mDeBERTa). We suggest and employ recommendations to tackle these challenges. Our results reveal low performance, even for English, and severe overfitting. We analyse various factors that influence these results, including label ambiguity, label set and dataset size. We find that the IQA performance is poor in high- (English, German) and low-resource languages (Bavarian) and that it is beneficial to have a large amount of training data. Further, GPT-4o-mini does not possess enough pragmatic understanding to generate high-quality IQA data in any of our tested languages.

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have achieved strong performance on tasks such as image captioning, visual question answering, and image-to-text generation. However, they are predominantly trained on English-centric data, which limits their ability to handle culturally grounded visual understanding and leads to failures in interpreting region-specific meanings, symbolic content, and context-dependent visual cues. Existing benchmarks for cultural competence are often template-driven and focused on surface-level recognition, making them insufficient for evaluating deeper linguistic and pragmatic understanding in culturally situated settings. We introduce PoVisLE, a monocultural vision-language benchmark for Polish designed to evaluate culturally grounded multimodal understanding under a grounded evaluation paradigm, where language is interpreted in interaction with visual context. The dataset contains 1,117 images and 2,366 manually annotated VQA pairs. Overall, our dataset provides a controlled and challenging resource for assessing culturally grounded vision-language understanding beyond surface-level recognition.

We present a comprehensive evaluation of the ability of large language models (LLMs) to process culturally grounded language, specifically to understand and pragmatically use figurative expressions that encode local knowledge and cultural nuance. Using figurative language as a proxy for cultural nuance and local knowledge, we design evaluation tasks for contextual understanding, pragmatic use, and connotation interpretation in Arabic and English. We evaluate 22 open- and closed-source LLMs on Egyptian Arabic idioms, multidialectal Arabic proverbs, and English proverbs. Our results show a consistent hierarchy: the average accuracy for Arabic proverbs is 4.29% lower than for English proverbs, and performance for Egyptian idioms is 10.28% lower than for Arabic proverbs. For the pragmatic use task, accuracy drops by 14.07% relative to understanding, though providing contextual idiomatic sentences improves accuracy by 10.66%. Models also struggle with connotative meaning, reaching at most 85.58% agreement with human annotators on idioms with 100% inter-annotator agreement. These findings demonstrate that figurative language serves as an effective diagnostic for cultural reasoning: while LLMs can often interpret figurative meaning, they face challenges in using it appropriately. To support future research, we release Kinayat, the first dataset of Egyptian Arabic idioms designed for both figurative understanding and pragmatic use evaluation.

Natural language understanding often depends on meanings that are implied rather than explicitly stated, requiring pragmatic reasoning. Despite strong performance on math and logical reasoning, large language models (LLMs) still struggle with making pragmatic inferences, often choosing literal interpretations. To improve LLM pragmatic reasoning, we introduce PragReST, a self-supervised framework that constructs pragmatic QA data, generates counterfactual reasoning traces, and trains models to internalize them through supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, without human-labeled training data or distillation from a stronger teacher. Across four pragmatic benchmarks (PragMega, Ludwig, MetoQA, and AltPrag), PragReST improves over backbone models, task-specific pragmatic tuning baselines, and non-counterfactual variants of the same pipeline. On accuracy-based benchmarks, PragReST improves over the instruct backbone by 5.37 and 5.50% (absolute) for Qwen3-8B and Qwen3-14B, respectively. Our error analysis and ablations underscore the importance of counterfactual reasoning: PragReST primarily reduces errors caused by failures to contrast observed utterances with plausible alternatives, and removing counterfactual reasoning substantially reduces performance. Moreover, our training preserves out-of-domain performance on general-knowledge and mathematical reasoning benchmarks.

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

For a large portion of real-life utterances, the intention cannot be solely decided by either their semantic or syntactic characteristics. Although not all the sociolinguistic and pragmatic information can be digitized, at least phonetic features are indispensable in understanding the spoken language. Especially in head-final languages such as Korean, sentence-final prosody has great importance in identifying the speaker's intention. This paper suggests a system which identifies the inherent intention of a spoken utterance given its transcript, in some cases using auxiliary acoustic features. The main point here is a separate distinction for cases where discrimination of intention requires an acoustic cue. Thus, the proposed classification system decides whether the given utterance is a fragment, statement, question, command, or a rhetorical question/command, utilizing the intonation-dependency coming from the head-finality. Based on an intuitive understanding of the Korean language that is engaged in the data annotation, we construct a network which identifies the intention of a speech, and validate its utility with the test sentences. The system, if combined with up-to-date speech recognizers, is expected to be flexibly inserted into various language understanding modules.

We revisit a pragmatic inference problem in dialog: understanding indirect responses to questions. Humans can interpret 'I'm starving.' in response to 'Hungry?', even without direct cue words such as 'yes' and 'no'. In dialog systems, allowing natural responses rather than closed vocabularies would be similarly beneficial. However, today's systems are only as sensitive to these pragmatic moves as their language model allows. We create and release the first large-scale English language corpus 'Circa' with 34,268 (polar question, indirect answer) pairs to enable progress on this task. The data was collected via elaborate crowdsourcing, and contains utterances with yes/no meaning, as well as uncertain, middle-ground, and conditional responses. We also present BERT-based neural models to predict such categories for a question-answer pair. We find that while transfer learning from entailment works reasonably, performance is not yet sufficient for robust dialog. Our models reach 82-88% accuracy for a 4-class distinction, and 74-85% for 6 classes.

We present the Mellum models family, open-weight code completion models designed for interactive use in JetBrains IDEs. Mellums have 4B parameters, adopt a Llama-style architecture, and are pre-trained on ~4T tokens of permissively licensed, multi-language code. Our studies show that (i) careful data curation and staged training significantly improve the model's quality, (ii) editor-critical capabilities such as context packing are necessary for high-quality suggestions, and (iii) a compact, task-focused model can meet the cost and latency constraints of interactive completion. In the paper, we describe an end-to-end industrial pipeline for producing contextualized in-editor completion: disciplined data governance, multi-stage training that includes fill-in-the-middle and project context via supervised fine-tuning, and alignment via direct preference optimization using feedback from real-world scenarios. Our quality evaluations include both large-scale offline benchmarks and online telemetry from production deployments in JetBrains IDEs. Mellums are released under the Apache-2.0 license on HuggingFace, with a public model card providing a reproducible reference for practitioners. Our experience offers a pragmatic blueprint for taking a focused, open model from a research prototype to at scale production for hundreds of thousands of users.

Is aesthetic impact different from beauty? Is visual salience a reflection of its capacity for effective communication? We present Impressions, a novel dataset through which to investigate the semiotics of images, and how specific visual features and design choices can elicit specific emotions, thoughts and beliefs. We posit that the impactfulness of an image extends beyond formal definitions of aesthetics, to its success as a communicative act, where style contributes as much to meaning formation as the subject matter. However, prior image captioning datasets are not designed to empower state-of-the-art architectures to model potential human impressions or interpretations of images. To fill this gap, we design an annotation task heavily inspired by image analysis techniques in the Visual Arts to collect 1,440 image-caption pairs and 4,320 unique annotations exploring impact, pragmatic image description, impressions, and aesthetic design choices. We show that existing multimodal image captioning and conditional generation models struggle to simulate plausible human responses to images. However, this dataset significantly improves their ability to model impressions and aesthetic evaluations of images through fine-tuning and few-shot adaptation.

A critical challenge in recommender systems is to establish reliable relationships between offline and online metrics that predict real-world performance. Motivated by recent advances in Pareto front approximation, we introduce a pragmatic strategy for identifying offline metrics that align with online impact. A key advantage of this approach is its ability to simultaneously serve multiple test groups, each with distinct offline performance metrics, in an online experiment controlled by a single model. The method is model-agnostic for systems with a neural network backbone, enabling broad applicability across architectures and domains. We validate the strategy through a large-scale online experiment in the field of session-based recommender systems on the OTTO e-commerce platform. The online experiment identifies significant alignments between offline metrics and real-word click-through rate, post-click conversion rate and units sold. Our strategy provides industry practitioners with a valuable tool for understanding offline-to-online metric relationships and making informed, data-driven decisions.

Internet memes are a powerful form of online communication, yet their nature and reliance on commonsense knowledge make toxicity detection challenging. Identifying key features for meme interpretation and understanding, is a crucial task. Previous work has been focused on some elements contributing to the meaning, such as the Textual dimension via OCR, the Visual dimension via object recognition, upper layers of meaning like the Emotional dimension, Toxicity detection via proxy variables, such as hate speech detection, and sentiment analysis. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of an overall architecture able to formally identify elements contributing to the meaning of a meme, and be used in the sense-making process. In this work, we present a semantic framework and a corresponding benchmark for automatic knowledge extraction from memes. First, we identify the necessary dimensions to understand and interpret a meme: Textual material, Visual material, Scene, Background Knowledge, Emotion, Semiotic Projection, Analogical Mapping, Overall Intent, Target Community, and Toxicity Assessment. Second, the framework guides a semi-automatic process of generating a benchmark with commonsense question-answer pairs about meme toxicity assessment and its underlying reason. The resulting benchmark M-QUEST consists of 609 question-answer pairs for 307 memes. Thirdly, we evaluate eight open-source large language models on their ability to correctly solve M-QUEST. Our results show that current models' commonsense reasoning capabilities for toxic meme interpretation vary depending on the dimension and architecture. Models with instruction tuning and reasoning capabilities significantly outperform the others, though pragmatic inference questions remain challenging. We release code, benchmark, and prompts to support future research intersecting multimodal content safety and commonsense reasoning.

LLMs have demonstrated remarkable capability for understanding semantics, but they often struggle with understanding pragmatics. To demonstrate this fact, we release a Pragmatics Understanding Benchmark (PUB) dataset consisting of fourteen tasks in four pragmatics phenomena, namely, Implicature, Presupposition, Reference, and Deixis. We curated high-quality test sets for each task, consisting of Multiple Choice Question Answers (MCQA). PUB includes a total of 28k data points, 6.1k of which have been created by us, and the rest are adapted from existing datasets. We evaluated nine models varying in the number of parameters and type of training. Our study indicates that fine-tuning for instruction-following and chat significantly enhances the pragmatics capabilities of smaller language models. However, for larger models, the base versions perform comparably with their chat-adapted counterparts. Additionally, there is a noticeable performance gap between human capabilities and model capabilities. Furthermore, unlike the consistent performance of humans across various tasks, the models demonstrate variability in their proficiency, with performance levels fluctuating due to different hints and the complexities of tasks within the same dataset. Overall, the benchmark aims to provide a comprehensive evaluation of LLM's ability to handle real-world language tasks that require pragmatic reasoning.

Implicit meanings are integral to human communication, making it essential for language models to be capable of identifying and interpreting them. Grice (1975) proposed a set of conversational maxims that guide cooperative dialogue, noting that speakers may deliberately violate these principles to express meanings beyond literal words, and that listeners, in turn, recognize such violations to draw pragmatic inferences. Building on Surian et al. (1996)'s study of children's sensitivity to violations of Gricean maxims, we introduce a novel benchmark to test whether language models pretrained on less than 10M and less than 100M tokens can distinguish maxim-adhering from maxim-violating utterances. We compare these BabyLMs across five maxims and situate their performance relative to children and a Large Language Model (LLM) pretrained on 3T tokens. We find that overall, models trained on less than 100M tokens outperform those trained on less than 10M, yet fall short of child-level and LLM competence. Our results suggest that modest data increases improve some aspects of pragmatic behavior, leading to finer-grained differentiation between pragmatic dimensions.

Language use is shaped by pragmatics -- i.e., reasoning about communicative goals and norms in context. As language models (LMs) are increasingly used as conversational agents, it becomes ever more important to understand their pragmatic reasoning abilities. We propose an evaluation framework derived from Wavelength, a popular communication game where a speaker and a listener communicate about a broad range of concepts in a granular manner. We study a range of LMs on both language comprehension and language production using direct and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, and further explore a Rational Speech Act (RSA) approach to incorporating Bayesian pragmatic reasoning into LM inference. We find that state-of-the-art LMs, but not smaller ones, achieve strong performance on language comprehension, obtaining similar-to-human accuracy and exhibiting high correlations with human judgments even without CoT prompting or RSA. On language production, CoT can outperform direct prompting, and using RSA provides significant improvements over both approaches. Our study helps identify the strengths and limitations in LMs' pragmatic reasoning abilities and demonstrates the potential for improving them with RSA, opening up future avenues for understanding conceptual representation, language understanding, and social reasoning in LMs and humans.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) face inherent limitations due to their pre-defined context lengths, which impede their capacity for multi-hop reasoning within extensive textual contexts. While existing techniques like Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) have attempted to bridge this gap by sourcing external information, they fall short when direct answers are not readily available. We introduce a novel approach that re-imagines information retrieval through dynamic in-context editing, inspired by recent breakthroughs in knowledge editing. By treating lengthy contexts as malleable external knowledge, our method interactively gathers and integrates relevant information, thereby enabling LLMs to perform sophisticated reasoning steps. Experimental results demonstrate that our method effectively empowers context-limited LLMs, such as Llama2, to engage in multi-hop reasoning with improved performance, which outperforms state-of-the-art context window extrapolation methods and even compares favorably to more advanced commercial long-context models. Our interactive method not only enhances reasoning capabilities but also mitigates the associated training and computational costs, making it a pragmatic solution for enhancing LLMs' reasoning within expansive contexts.

Pre-trained language models like ChatGPT have significantly improved code generation. As these models scale up, there is an increasing need for the output to handle more intricate tasks. Moreover, in bioinformatics, generating functional programs poses additional notable challenges due to the amount of domain knowledge, the need for complicated data operations, and intricate functional dependencies between the operations. Here, we present BioCoder, a benchmark developed to evaluate existing pre-trained models in generating bioinformatics code. In relation to function-code generation, BioCoder covers potential package dependencies, class declarations, and global variables. It incorporates 1026 functions and 1243 methods in Python and Java from GitHub and 253 examples from the Rosalind Project. BioCoder incorporates a fuzz-testing framework for evaluation, and we have applied it to evaluate many models including InCoder, CodeGen, CodeGen2, SantaCoder, StarCoder, StarCoder+, InstructCodeT5+, and ChatGPT. Our detailed analysis of these models emphasizes the importance of domain knowledge, pragmatic code generation, and contextual understanding. Our dataset, benchmark, Docker images, and scripts required for testing are all available at https://github.com/gersteinlab/biocoder.

Discourse particles, such as well and kind of, are crucial components that enable LLMs to ``speak'' more like humans. They are used to convey emotions, intentions, and interpersonal meanings. However, existing studies have not yet built a comprehensive understanding of LLMs' capabilities in handling discourse particles. Moreover, the limited number of studies focuses primarily on high-resource languages such as English, with little attention paid to Southeast Asian languages. In this paper, we (1) propose MalayPrag, a benchmark designed to systematically evaluate and analyze LLMs' capabilities in handling discourse particles in colloquial Malay; and (2) introduce five attributes that provide a linguistically grounded, unified framework for interpreting the pragmatic functions of discourse particles. Applying these two contributions, we prompt ten off-the-shelf LLMs to perform three prediction tasks. The experimental results reveal substantial challenges for current LLMs in accurately connecting discourse particles with their pragmatic functions in Malay. The provision of the five attributes designed in this study is found to significantly improve these connections, highlighting the need for structured scaffolding for models' pragmatic competence.

Driver distraction has become a significant cause of severe traffic accidents over the past decade. Despite the growing development of vision-driven driver monitoring systems, the lack of comprehensive perception datasets restricts road safety and traffic security. In this paper, we present an AssIstive Driving pErception dataset (AIDE) that considers context information both inside and outside the vehicle in naturalistic scenarios. AIDE facilitates holistic driver monitoring through three distinctive characteristics, including multi-view settings of driver and scene, multi-modal annotations of face, body, posture, and gesture, and four pragmatic task designs for driving understanding. To thoroughly explore AIDE, we provide experimental benchmarks on three kinds of baseline frameworks via extensive methods. Moreover, two fusion strategies are introduced to give new insights into learning effective multi-stream/modal representations. We also systematically investigate the importance and rationality of the key components in AIDE and benchmarks. The project link is https://github.com/ydk122024/AIDE.

New models for natural language understanding have recently made an unparalleled amount of progress, which has led some researchers to suggest that the models induce universal text representations. However, current benchmarks are predominantly targeting semantic phenomena; we make the case that pragmatics needs to take center stage in the evaluation of natural language understanding. We introduce PragmEval, a new benchmark for the evaluation of natural language understanding, that unites 11 pragmatics-focused evaluation datasets for English. PragmEval can be used as supplementary training data in a multi-task learning setup, and is publicly available, alongside the code for gathering and preprocessing the datasets. Using our evaluation suite, we show that natural language inference, a widely used pretraining task, does not result in genuinely universal representations, which presents a new challenge for multi-task learning.

Explainability has become an important topic in computer science and artificial intelligence, leading to a subfield called Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). The goal of providing or seeking explanations is to achieve (better) 'understanding' on the part of the explainee. However, what it means to 'understand' is still not clearly defined, and the concept itself is rarely the subject of scientific investigation. This conceptual article aims to present a model of forms of understanding for XAI-explanations and beyond. From an interdisciplinary perspective bringing together computer science, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and psychology, a definition of understanding and its forms, assessment, and dynamics during the process of giving everyday explanations are explored. Two types of understanding are considered as possible outcomes of explanations, namely enabledness, 'knowing how' to do or decide something, and comprehension, 'knowing that' -- both in different degrees (from shallow to deep). Explanations regularly start with shallow understanding in a specific domain and can lead to deep comprehension and enabledness of the explanandum, which we see as a prerequisite for human users to gain agency. In this process, the increase of comprehension and enabledness are highly interdependent. Against the background of this systematization, special challenges of understanding in XAI are discussed.

While moral reasoning has emerged as a promising research direction for large language models (LLMs), achieving robust generalization remains a critical challenge. This challenge arises from the gap between what is said and what is morally implied. In this paper, we build on metapragmatic links and the moral foundations theory to close the gap. Specifically, we develop a pragmatic-inference approach that facilitates LLMs, for a given moral situation, to acquire the metapragmantic links between moral reasoning objectives and the social variables that affect them. This approach is adapted to three different moral reasoning tasks to demonstrate its adaptability and generalizability. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances LLMs' generalization in moral reasoning, paving the road for future research to utilize pragmatic inference in various moral reasoning tasks.

Large language models work well on English and behave in poorly understood ways on languages typologically far from it. Japanese is a clean example, where evaluation still leans on translation quality and JGLUE-style benchmarks, which roll lexical, syntactic and pragmatic competence into a single score. The phenomena on which general-purpose models fail Japanese users are pragmatic: honorifics, in-group and out-group reference, context-sensitive politeness, zero anaphora. I introduce J-PragEval-v0, a minimal-pair benchmark isolating four such phenomena from surface fluency, and combine it with linear probes and teacher-forced log-probability evaluation to ask where inside TinySwallow-1.5B (28 layers, hidden size 1536) the corresponding contrasts live. The four features split three ways. Honorific register sits cleanly in the residual stream: 0.96 balanced accuracy at layer 15, and the model flips its preferred continuation with the scenario on 93 percent of items. Implicit subject and in-group reference are not linearly decodable at the final prompt token (0.48 and 0.38), yet flip rates are 0.77 and 0.79, so the contrast is worked out during generation rather than stored at the prompt. Indirect refusal is the negative case: 0.95 probe accuracy collapsing to a 0.43 flip rate under length-normalised teacher forcing, because the current minimal pairs conflate politeness with continuation length. I also specify Pragmatic Representation Steering, a parameter-free inference-time method that edits residual-stream activations along the class-mean-difference directions probing identifies. Feasibility is argued indirectly rather than demonstrated: the contrastive activation addition baseline, the same geometry the method would inject, recovers probe accuracy within one to two points of logistic regression wherever a linear signal exists. Scaling to Llama-3.1-Swallow-8B is the next step.

Moral sensitivity is fundamental to human moral competence, as it guides individuals in regulating everyday behavior. Although many approaches seek to align large language models (LLMs) with human moral values, how to enable them morally sensitive has been extremely challenging. In this paper, we take a step toward answering the question: how can we enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs? Specifically, we propose two pragmatic inference methods that faciliate LLMs to diagnose morally benign and hazardous input and correct moral errors, whereby enhancing LLMs' moral sensitivity. A central strength of our pragmatic inference methods is their unified perspective: instead of modeling moral discourses across semantically diverse and complex surface forms, they offer a principled perspective for designing pragmatic inference procedures grounded in their inferential loads. Empirical evidence demonstrates that our pragmatic methods can enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs and achieves strong performance on representative morality-relevant benchmarks.

Natural language inference (NLI) is an increasingly important task for natural language understanding, which requires one to infer whether a sentence entails another. However, the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic inferences remains understudied. We create an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of >25k semiautomatically generated sentence pairs illustrating well-studied pragmatic inference types. We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT, InferSent, and BOW NLI models trained on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI appears to contain very few pairs illustrating these inference types, we find that BERT learns to draw pragmatic inferences. It reliably treats scalar implicatures triggered by "some" as entailments. For some presupposition triggers like "only", BERT reliably recognizes the presupposition as an entailment, even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator like negation. BOW and InferSent show weaker evidence of pragmatic reasoning. We conclude that NLI training encourages models to learn some, but not all, pragmatic inferences.

We improve the informativeness of models for conditional text generation using techniques from computational pragmatics. These techniques formulate language production as a game between speakers and listeners, in which a speaker should generate output text that a listener can use to correctly identify the original input that the text describes. While such approaches are widely used in cognitive science and grounded language learning, they have received less attention for more standard language generation tasks. We consider two pragmatic modeling methods for text generation: one where pragmatics is imposed by information preservation, and another where pragmatics is imposed by explicit modeling of distractors. We find that these methods improve the performance of strong existing systems for abstractive summarization and generation from structured meaning representations.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

Probabilistic models of language understanding are valuable tools for investigating human language use. However, they need to be hand-designed for a particular domain. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) are trained on text that spans a wide array of domains, but they lack the structure and interpretability of probabilistic models. In this paper, we use chain-of-thought prompts to introduce structures from probabilistic models into LLMs. We explore this approach in the case of metaphor understanding. Our chain-of-thought prompts lead language models to infer latent variables and reason about their relationships in order to choose appropriate paraphrases for metaphors. The latent variables and relationships chosen are informed by theories of metaphor understanding from cognitive psychology. We apply these prompts to the two largest versions of GPT-3 and show that they can improve performance in a paraphrase selection task.

Referring Expression Generation (REG) is a core task for evaluating the pragmatic competence of vision-language systems, requiring not only accurate semantic grounding but also adherence to principles of cooperative communication (Grice, 1975). However, current evaluations of vision-language models (VLMs) often overlook the pragmatic dimension, reducing REG to a region-based captioning task and neglecting Gricean maxims. In this work, we revisit REG from a pragmatic perspective, introducing a new dataset (RefOI) of 1.5k images annotated with both written and spoken referring expressions. Through a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art VLMs, we identify three key failures of pragmatic competence: (1) failure to uniquely identify the referent, (2) inclusion of excessive or irrelevant information, and (3) misalignment with human pragmatic preference, such as the underuse of minimal spatial cues. We also show that standard automatic evaluations fail to capture these pragmatic violations, reinforcing superficial cues rather than genuine referential success. Our findings call for a renewed focus on pragmatically informed models and evaluation frameworks that align with real human communication.

We study syllogistic reasoning in LLMs from the logical and natural language perspectives. In process, we explore fundamental reasoning capabilities of the LLMs and the direction this research is moving forward. To aid in our studies, we use 14 large language models and investigate their syllogistic reasoning capabilities in terms of symbolic inferences as well as natural language understanding. Even though this reasoning mechanism is not a uniform emergent property across LLMs, the perfect symbolic performances in certain models make us wonder whether LLMs are becoming more and more formal reasoning mechanisms, rather than making explicit the nuances of human reasoning.

The social and implicit nature of human communication ramifies readers' understandings of written sentences. Single gold-standard interpretations rarely exist, challenging conventional assumptions in natural language processing. This work introduces the interpretation modeling (IM) task which involves modeling several interpretations of a sentence's underlying semantics to unearth layers of implicit meaning. To obtain these, IM is guided by multiple annotations of social relation and common ground - in this work approximated by reader attitudes towards the author and their understanding of moral judgments subtly embedded in the sentence. We propose a number of modeling strategies that rely on one-to-one and one-to-many generation methods that take inspiration from the philosophical study of interpretation. A first-of-its-kind IM dataset is curated to support experiments and analyses. The modeling results, coupled with scrutiny of the dataset, underline the challenges of IM as conflicting and complex interpretations are socially plausible. This interplay of diverse readings is affirmed by automated and human evaluations on the generated interpretations. Finally, toxicity analyses in the generated interpretations demonstrate the importance of IM for refining filters of content and assisting content moderators in safeguarding the safety in online discourse.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit human-like patterns of pragmatic and social reasoning. This paper addresses two related questions: do LLMs approximate human social meaning not only qualitatively but also quantitatively, and can prompting strategies informed by pragmatic theory improve this approximation? To address the first, we introduce two calibration-focused metrics distinguishing structural fidelity from magnitude calibration: the Effect Size Ratio (ESR) and the Calibration Deviation Score (CDS). To address the second, we derive prompting conditions from two pragmatic assumptions: that social meaning arises from reasoning over linguistic alternatives, and that listeners infer speaker knowledge states and communicative motives. Applied to a case study on numerical (im)precision across three frontier LLMs, we find that all models reliably reproduce the qualitative structure of human social inferences but differ substantially in magnitude calibration. Prompting models to reason about speaker knowledge and motives most consistently reduces magnitude deviation, while prompting for alternative-awareness tends to amplify exaggeration. Combining both components is the only intervention that improves all calibration-sensitive metrics across all models, though fine-grained magnitude calibration remains only partially resolved. LLMs thus capture inferential structure while variably distorting inferential strength, and pragmatic theory provides a useful but incomplete handle for improving that approximation.

In classic instruction following, language like "I'd like the JetBlue flight" maps to actions (e.g., selecting that flight). However, language also conveys information about a user's underlying reward function (e.g., a general preference for JetBlue), which can allow a model to carry out desirable actions in new contexts. We present a model that infers rewards from language pragmatically: reasoning about how speakers choose utterances not only to elicit desired actions, but also to reveal information about their preferences. On a new interactive flight-booking task with natural language, our model more accurately infers rewards and predicts optimal actions in unseen environments, in comparison to past work that first maps language to actions (instruction following) and then maps actions to rewards (inverse reinforcement learning).

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and GPT-4 have made significant progress in NLP. However, their ability to memorize, represent, and leverage commonsense knowledge has been a well-known pain point for LLMs. It remains unclear that: (1) Can GPTs effectively answer commonsense questions? (2) Are GPTs knowledgeable in commonsense? (3) Are GPTs aware of the underlying commonsense knowledge for answering a specific question? (4) Can GPTs effectively leverage commonsense for answering questions? To evaluate the above commonsense problems, we conduct a series of experiments to evaluate ChatGPT's commonsense abilities, and the experimental results show that: (1) GPTs can achieve good QA accuracy in commonsense tasks, while they still struggle with certain types of knowledge. (2) ChatGPT is knowledgeable, and can accurately generate most of the commonsense knowledge using knowledge prompts. (3) Despite its knowledge, ChatGPT is an inexperienced commonsense problem solver, which cannot precisely identify the needed commonsense knowledge for answering a specific question, i.e., ChatGPT does not precisely know what commonsense knowledge is required to answer a question. The above findings raise the need to investigate better mechanisms for utilizing commonsense knowledge in LLMs, such as instruction following, better commonsense guidance, etc.

Figurative and metaphorical language are commonplace in discourse, and figurative expressions play an important role in communication and cognition. However, figurative language has been a relatively under-studied area in NLP, and it remains an open question to what extent modern language models can interpret nonliteral phrases. To address this question, we introduce Fig-QA, a Winograd-style nonliteral language understanding task consisting of correctly interpreting paired figurative phrases with divergent meanings. We evaluate the performance of several state-of-the-art language models on this task, and find that although language models achieve performance significantly over chance, they still fall short of human performance, particularly in zero- or few-shot settings. This suggests that further work is needed to improve the nonliteral reasoning capabilities of language models.

Robotic task instructions often involve a referred object that the robot must locate (ground) within the environment. While task intent understanding is an essential part of natural language understanding, less effort is made to resolve ambiguity that may arise while grounding the task. Existing works use vision-based task grounding and ambiguity detection, suitable for a fixed view and a static robot. However, the problem magnifies for a mobile robot, where the ideal view is not known beforehand. Moreover, a single view may not be sufficient to locate all the object instances in the given area, which leads to inaccurate ambiguity detection. Human intervention is helpful only if the robot can convey the kind of ambiguity it is facing. In this article, we present DoRO (Disambiguation of Referred Object), a system that can help an embodied agent to disambiguate the referred object by raising a suitable query whenever required. Given an area where the intended object is, DoRO finds all the instances of the object by aggregating observations from multiple views while exploring & scanning the area. It then raises a suitable query using the information from the grounded object instances. Experiments conducted with the AI2Thor simulator show that DoRO not only detects the ambiguity more accurately but also raises verbose queries with more accurate information from the visual-language grounding.

Embodied language comprehension emphasizes that language understanding is not solely a matter of mental processing in the brain but also involves interactions with the physical and social environment. With the explosive growth of Large Language Models (LLMs) and their already ubiquitous presence in our daily lives, it is becoming increasingly necessary to verify their real-world understanding. Inspired by cognitive theories, we propose POSQA: a Physical Object Size Question Answering dataset with simple size comparison questions to examine the extremity and analyze the potential mechanisms of the embodied comprehension of the latest LLMs. We show that even the largest LLMs today perform poorly under the zero-shot setting. We then push their limits with advanced prompting techniques and external knowledge augmentation. Furthermore, we investigate whether their real-world comprehension primarily derives from contextual information or internal weights and analyse the impact of prompt formats and report bias of different objects. Our results show that real-world understanding that LLMs shaped from textual data can be vulnerable to deception and confusion by the surface form of prompts, which makes it less aligned with human behaviours.

Drawing on contemporary pragmatist philosophy and linguistic theories on cognition, meaning, and communication, this paper presents a dynamic, metasemantic-metapragmatic taxonomy for grounding and conceptualizing human-like multimodal communicative alignment. The framework is rooted in contemporary developments of the three basic communicative capacities initially identified by American logician and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: iconic (sensory and perceptual qualities), indexical (contextual and sociocultural associations), and rule-like (symbolic and intuitive reasoning). Expanding on these developments, I introduce the concept of indexical contextualization and propose the principle of "contextualization directionality" for characterizing the crucial metapragmatic capacity for maintaining, navigating, or transitioning between semantic and pragmatic modes of multimodal communication. I contend that current cognitive-social computational and engineering methodologies disproportionately emphasize the semantic/metasemantic domain, overlooking the pivotal role of metapragmatic indexicality in traversing the semantic-pragmatic spectrum of communication. The framework's broader implications for intentionality, identity, affect, and ethics in within-modal and cross-modal human-machine alignment are also discussed.

Large Vision-Language models (VLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning capabilities in tasks requiring a fine-grained understanding of literal images and text, such as visual question-answering or visual entailment. However, there has been little exploration of these models' capabilities when presented with images and captions containing figurative phenomena such as metaphors or humor, the meaning of which is often implicit. To close this gap, we propose a new task and a high-quality dataset: Visual Figurative Language Understanding with Textual Explanations (V-FLUTE). We frame the visual figurative language understanding problem as an explainable visual entailment task, where the model has to predict whether the image (premise) entails a claim (hypothesis) and justify the predicted label with a textual explanation. Using a human-AI collaboration framework, we build a high-quality dataset, V-FLUTE, that contains 6,027 <image, claim, label, explanation> instances spanning five diverse multimodal figurative phenomena: metaphors, similes, idioms, sarcasm, and humor. The figurative phenomena can be present either in the image, the caption, or both. We further conduct both automatic and human evaluations to assess current VLMs' capabilities in understanding figurative phenomena.

Ambiguous words or underspecified references require interlocutors to resolve them, often by relying on shared context and commonsense knowledge. Therefore, we systematically investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can leverage commonsense to resolve referential ambiguity in multi-turn conversations and analyze their behavior when ambiguity persists. Further, we study how requests for simplified language affect this capacity. Using a novel multilingual evaluation dataset, we test DeepSeek v3, GPT-4o, Qwen3-32B, GPT-4o-mini, and Llama-3.1-8B via LLM-as-Judge and human annotations. Our findings indicate that current LLMs struggle to resolve ambiguity effectively: they tend to commit to a single interpretation or cover all possible references, rather than hedging or seeking clarification. This limitation becomes more pronounced under simplification prompts, which drastically reduce the use of commonsense reasoning and diverse response strategies. Fine-tuning Llama-3.1-8B with Direct Preference Optimization substantially improves ambiguity resolution across all request types. These results underscore the need for advanced fine-tuning to improve LLMs' handling of ambiguity and to ensure robust performance across diverse communication styles.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of artificial intelligence, multi-modal large language models are emerging as a significant area of interest. These models, which combine various forms of data input, are becoming increasingly popular. However, understanding their internal mechanisms remains a complex task. Numerous advancements have been made in the field of explainability tools and mechanisms, yet there is still much to explore. In this work, we present a novel interactive application aimed towards understanding the internal mechanisms of large vision-language models. Our interface is designed to enhance the interpretability of the image patches, which are instrumental in generating an answer, and assess the efficacy of the language model in grounding its output in the image. With our application, a user can systematically investigate the model and uncover system limitations, paving the way for enhancements in system capabilities. Finally, we present a case study of how our application can aid in understanding failure mechanisms in a popular large multi-modal model: LLaVA.

Modern dialog managers face the challenge of having to fulfill human-level conversational skills as part of common user expectations, including but not limited to discourse with no clear objective. Along with these requirements, agents are expected to extrapolate intent from the user's dialogue even when subjected to non-canonical forms of speech. This depends on the agent's comprehension of paraphrased forms of such utterances. Especially in low-resource languages, the lack of data is a bottleneck that prevents advancements of the comprehension performance for these types of agents. In this regard, here we demonstrate the necessity of extracting the intent argument of non-canonical directives in a natural language format, which may yield more accurate parsing, and suggest guidelines for building a parallel corpus for this purpose. Following the guidelines, we construct a Korean corpus of 50K instances of question/command-intent pairs, including the labels for classification of the utterance type. We also propose a method for mitigating class imbalance, demonstrating the potential applications of the corpus generation method and its multilingual extensibility.

Human language is driven by unspoken beliefs and belief updates, making these critical to model for successful communication between large language models (LLMs) and their users. In this paper, we evaluate the ability of LLMs to recognize unspoken beliefs made through implicatures and to understand their updates through implicature cancellation: the pragmatic phenomenon whereby an utterance's implied meaning is weakened or negated. We create the first expert-annotated implicature cancellation dataset, ImplicatureX, crowdsourced for human judgements of implicatures and their corresponding cancellations. We find that LLM belief update understanding lags behind that of humans, especially in more naturally-occurring scenarios. Additional control experiments suggest that successes in LLM belief updates may stem in part from a reliance on prior beliefs, and that failures in belief updates may depend on their type and on their form. Overall, our study suggests that current LLMs have not yet reached human-level understanding of unspoken beliefs and belief updates. Code and data are available at https://github.com/cesare-spinoso/ImplicatureX.

Sarcasm is a challenge to sentiment analysis because of the incongruity between stated and implied sentiment. The challenge is exacerbated when the implication may be relevant to a specific country or geographical region. Pragmatic metacognitive prompting (PMP) is a cognition-inspired technique that has been used for pragmatic reasoning. In this paper, we harness PMP for explainable sarcasm detection for Australian and Indian English, alongside a benchmark dataset for standard English. We manually add sarcasm explanations to an existing sarcasm-labeled dataset for Australian and Indian English called BESSTIE, and compare the performance for explainable sarcasm detection for them with FLUTE, a standard English dataset containing sarcasm explanations. Our approach utilising PMP when evaluated on two open-weight LLMs (GEMMA and LLAMA) achieves statistically significant performance improvement across all tasks and datasets when compared with four alternative prompting strategies. We also find that alternative techniques such as agentic prompting mitigate context-related failures by enabling external knowledge retrieval. The focused contribution of our work is utilising PMP in generating sarcasm explanations for varieties of English.

Generalized quantifiers (e.g., few, most) are used to indicate the proportions predicates are satisfied (for example, some apples are red). One way to interpret quantifier semantics is to explicitly bind these satisfactions with percentage scopes (e.g., 30%-40% of apples are red). This approach can be helpful for tasks like logic formalization and surface-form quantitative reasoning (Gordon and Schubert, 2010; Roy et al., 2015). However, it remains unclear if recent foundation models possess this ability, as they lack direct training signals. To explore this, we introduce QuRe, a crowd-sourced dataset of human-annotated generalized quantifiers in Wikipedia sentences featuring percentage-equipped predicates. We explore quantifier comprehension in language models using PRESQUE, a framework that combines natural language inference and the Rational Speech Acts framework. Experimental results on the HVD dataset and QuRe illustrate that PRESQUE, employing pragmatic reasoning, performs 20% better than a literal reasoning baseline when predicting quantifier percentage scopes, with no additional training required.

Mastering commonsense understanding and reasoning is a pivotal skill essential for conducting engaging conversations. While there have been several attempts to create datasets that facilitate commonsense inferences in dialogue contexts, existing datasets tend to lack in-depth details, restate information already present in the conversation, and often fail to capture the multifaceted nature of commonsense reasoning. In response to these limitations, we compile a new synthetic dataset for commonsense reasoning in dialogue contexts using GPT, ConvoSense, that boasts greater contextual novelty, offers a higher volume of inferences per example, and substantially enriches the detail conveyed by the inferences. Our dataset contains over 500,000 inferences across 12,000 dialogues with 10 popular inference types, which empowers the training of generative commonsense models for dialogue that are superior in producing plausible inferences with high novelty when compared to models trained on the previous datasets. To the best of our knowledge, ConvoSense is the first of its kind to provide such a multitude of novel inferences at such a large scale.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Understanding sentence meanings and updating information states appropriately across time -- what we call "situational understanding" (SU) -- is a critical ability for human-like AI agents. SU is essential in particular for chat models, such as ChatGPT, to enable consistent, coherent, and effective dialogue between humans and AI. Previous works have identified certain SU limitations in non-chatbot Large Language models (LLMs), but the extent and causes of these limitations are not well understood, and capabilities of current chat-based models in this domain have not been explored. In this work we tackle these questions, proposing a novel synthetic environment for SU testing which allows us to do controlled and systematic testing of SU in chat-oriented models, through assessment of models' ability to track and enumerate environment states. Our environment also allows for close analysis of dynamics of model performance, to better understand underlying causes for performance patterns. We apply our test to ChatGPT, the state-of-the-art chatbot, and find that despite the fundamental simplicity of the task, the model's performance reflects an inability to retain correct environment states across time. Our follow-up analyses suggest that performance degradation is largely because ChatGPT has non-persistent in-context memory (although it can access the full dialogue history) and it is susceptible to hallucinated updates -- including updates that artificially inflate accuracies. Our findings suggest overall that ChatGPT is not currently equipped for robust tracking of situation states, and that trust in the impressive dialogue performance of ChatGPT comes with risks. We release the codebase for reproducing our test environment, as well as all prompts and API responses from ChatGPT, at https://github.com/yangalan123/SituationalTesting.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

One long-term goal of machine learning research is to produce methods that are applicable to reasoning and natural language, in particular building an intelligent dialogue agent. To measure progress towards that goal, we argue for the usefulness of a set of proxy tasks that evaluate reading comprehension via question answering. Our tasks measure understanding in several ways: whether a system is able to answer questions via chaining facts, simple induction, deduction and many more. The tasks are designed to be prerequisites for any system that aims to be capable of conversing with a human. We believe many existing learning systems can currently not solve them, and hence our aim is to classify these tasks into skill sets, so that researchers can identify (and then rectify) the failings of their systems. We also extend and improve the recently introduced Memory Networks model, and show it is able to solve some, but not all, of the tasks.

Language models (LMs) are trained on collections of documents, written by individual human agents to achieve specific goals in an outside world. During training, LMs have access only to text of these documents, with no direct evidence of the internal states of the agents that produced them -- a fact often used to argue that LMs are incapable of modeling goal-directed aspects of human language production and comprehension. Can LMs trained on text learn anything at all about the relationship between language and use? I argue that LMs are models of intentional communication in a specific, narrow sense. When performing next word prediction given a textual context, an LM can infer and represent properties of an agent likely to have produced that context. These representations can in turn influence subsequent LM generation in the same way that agents' communicative intentions influence their language. I survey findings from the recent literature showing that -- even in today's non-robust and error-prone models -- LMs infer and use representations of fine-grained communicative intentions and more abstract beliefs and goals. Despite the limited nature of their training data, they can thus serve as building blocks for systems that communicate and act intentionally.

Reading comprehension (RC)---in contrast to information retrieval---requires integrating information and reasoning about events, entities, and their relations across a full document. Question answering is conventionally used to assess RC ability, in both artificial agents and children learning to read. However, existing RC datasets and tasks are dominated by questions that can be solved by selecting answers using superficial information (e.g., local context similarity or global term frequency); they thus fail to test for the essential integrative aspect of RC. To encourage progress on deeper comprehension of language, we present a new dataset and set of tasks in which the reader must answer questions about stories by reading entire books or movie scripts. These tasks are designed so that successfully answering their questions requires understanding the underlying narrative rather than relying on shallow pattern matching or salience. We show that although humans solve the tasks easily, standard RC models struggle on the tasks presented here. We provide an analysis of the dataset and the challenges it presents.

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

Writing Assistants (e.g., Grammarly, Microsoft Copilot) traditionally generate diverse image captions by employing syntactic and semantic variations to describe image components. However, human-written captions prioritize conveying a central message alongside visual descriptions using pragmatic cues. To enhance pragmatic diversity, it is essential to explore alternative ways of communicating these messages in conjunction with visual content. To address this challenge, we propose RONA, a novel prompting strategy for Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLM) that leverages Coherence Relations as an axis for variation. We demonstrate that RONA generates captions with better overall diversity and ground-truth alignment, compared to MLLM baselines across multiple domains. Our code is available at: https://github.com/aashish2000/RONA

The issue of shortcut learning is widely known in NLP and has been an important research focus in recent years. Unintended correlations in the data enable models to easily solve tasks that were meant to exhibit advanced language understanding and reasoning capabilities. In this survey paper, we focus on the field of machine reading comprehension (MRC), an important task for showcasing high-level language understanding that also suffers from a range of shortcuts. We summarize the available techniques for measuring and mitigating shortcuts and conclude with suggestions for further progress in shortcut research. Importantly, we highlight two concerns for shortcut mitigation in MRC: (1) the lack of public challenge sets, a necessary component for effective and reusable evaluation, and (2) the lack of certain mitigation techniques that are prominent in other areas.

Large language models often respond to ambiguous requests by implicitly committing to one interpretation. Intent misunderstandings can frustrate users and create safety risks. To address this, we propose generating multiple interpretation-answer pairs in a single structured response to ambiguous requests. Our models are trained with reinforcement learning and customized reward functions using multiple valid answers as supervision. Experiments on conversational question answering and semantic parsing demonstrate that our method achieves higher coverage of valid answers than baseline approaches. Human evaluation confirms that predicted interpretations are highly aligned with their answers. Our approach promotes transparency with explicit interpretations, achieves efficiency by requiring only one generation step, and supports downstream applications through its structured output format.

In this work we explore how fine-grained differences between the shapes of common objects are expressed in language, grounded on images and 3D models of the objects. We first build a large scale, carefully controlled dataset of human utterances that each refers to a 2D rendering of a 3D CAD model so as to distinguish it from a set of shape-wise similar alternatives. Using this dataset, we develop neural language understanding (listening) and production (speaking) models that vary in their grounding (pure 3D forms via point-clouds vs. rendered 2D images), the degree of pragmatic reasoning captured (e.g. speakers that reason about a listener or not), and the neural architecture (e.g. with or without attention). We find models that perform well with both synthetic and human partners, and with held out utterances and objects. We also find that these models are amenable to zero-shot transfer learning to novel object classes (e.g. transfer from training on chairs to testing on lamps), as well as to real-world images drawn from furniture catalogs. Lesion studies indicate that the neural listeners depend heavily on part-related words and associate these words correctly with visual parts of objects (without any explicit network training on object parts), and that transfer to novel classes is most successful when known part-words are available. This work illustrates a practical approach to language grounding, and provides a case study in the relationship between object shape and linguistic structure when it comes to object differentiation.

Models of language trained on very large corpora have been demonstrated useful for NLP. As fixed artifacts, they have become the object of intense study, with many researchers "probing" the extent to which linguistic abstractions, factual and commonsense knowledge, and reasoning abilities they acquire and readily demonstrate. Building on this line of work, we consider a new question: for types of knowledge a language model learns, when during (pre)training are they acquired? We plot probing performance across iterations, using RoBERTa as a case study. Among our findings: linguistic knowledge is acquired fast, stably, and robustly across domains. Facts and commonsense are slower and more domain-sensitive. Reasoning abilities are, in general, not stably acquired. As new datasets, pretraining protocols, and probes emerge, we believe that probing-across-time analyses can help researchers understand the complex, intermingled learning that these models undergo and guide us toward more efficient approaches that accomplish necessary learning faster.

Understanding commonsense causality is a unique mark of intelligence for humans. It helps people understand the principles of the real world better and benefits the decision-making process related to causation. For instance, commonsense causality is crucial in judging whether a defendant's action causes the plaintiff's loss in determining legal liability. Despite its significance, a systematic exploration of this topic is notably lacking. Our comprehensive survey bridges this gap by focusing on taxonomies, benchmarks, acquisition methods, qualitative reasoning, and quantitative measurements in commonsense causality, synthesizing insights from over 200 representative articles. Our work aims to provide a systematic overview, update scholars on recent advancements, provide a pragmatic guide for beginners, and highlight promising future research directions in this vital field.

Studying the responses of large language models (LLMs) to loopholes presents a two-fold opportunity. First, it affords us a lens through which to examine ambiguity and pragmatics in LLMs, since exploiting a loophole requires identifying ambiguity and performing sophisticated pragmatic reasoning. Second, loopholes pose an interesting and novel alignment problem where the model is presented with conflicting goals and can exploit ambiguities to its own advantage. To address these questions, we design scenarios where LLMs are given a goal and an ambiguous user instruction in conflict with the goal, with scenarios covering scalar implicature, structural ambiguities, and power dynamics. We then measure different models' abilities to exploit loopholes to satisfy their given goals as opposed to the goals of the user. We find that both closed-source and stronger open-source models can identify ambiguities and exploit their resulting loopholes, presenting a potential AI safety risk. Our analysis indicates that models which exploit loopholes explicitly identify and reason about both ambiguity and conflicting goals.

This position paper argues that, in order to understand AI, we cannot rely on our existing vocabulary of human words. Instead, we should strive to develop neologisms: new words that represent precise human concepts that we want to teach machines, or machine concepts that we need to learn. We start from the premise that humans and machines have differing concepts. This means interpretability can be framed as a communication problem: humans must be able to reference and control machine concepts, and communicate human concepts to machines. Creating a shared human-machine language through developing neologisms, we believe, could solve this communication problem. Successful neologisms achieve a useful amount of abstraction: not too detailed, so they're reusable in many contexts, and not too high-level, so they convey precise information. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate how a "length neologism" enables controlling LLM response length, while a "diversity neologism" allows sampling more variable responses. Taken together, we argue that we cannot understand AI using our existing vocabulary, and expanding it through neologisms creates opportunities for both controlling and understanding machines better.

Natural language serves as the primary mode of communication when an intelligent agent with a physical presence engages with human beings. While a plethora of research focuses on natural language understanding (NLU), encompassing endeavors such as sentiment analysis, intent prediction, question answering, and summarization, the scope of NLU directed at situations necessitating tangible actions by an embodied agent remains limited. The inherent ambiguity and incompleteness inherent in natural language present challenges for intelligent agents striving to decipher human intention. To tackle this predicament head-on, we introduce a novel system known as task and argument grounding for Embodied agents (tagE). At its core, our system employs an inventive neural network model designed to extract a series of tasks from complex task instructions expressed in natural language. Our proposed model adopts an encoder-decoder framework enriched with nested decoding to effectively extract tasks and their corresponding arguments from these intricate instructions. These extracted tasks are then mapped (or grounded) to the robot's established collection of skills, while the arguments find grounding in objects present within the environment. To facilitate the training and evaluation of our system, we have curated a dataset featuring complex instructions. The results of our experiments underscore the prowess of our approach, as it outperforms robust baseline models.

To successfully negotiate a deal, it is not enough to communicate fluently: pragmatic planning of persuasive negotiation strategies is essential. While modern dialogue agents excel at generating fluent sentences, they still lack pragmatic grounding and cannot reason strategically. We present DialoGraph, a negotiation system that incorporates pragmatic strategies in a negotiation dialogue using graph neural networks. DialoGraph explicitly incorporates dependencies between sequences of strategies to enable improved and interpretable prediction of next optimal strategies, given the dialogue context. Our graph-based method outperforms prior state-of-the-art negotiation models both in the accuracy of strategy/dialogue act prediction and in the quality of downstream dialogue response generation. We qualitatively show further benefits of learned strategy-graphs in providing explicit associations between effective negotiation strategies over the course of the dialogue, leading to interpretable and strategic dialogues.

This position paper argues that the text embedding research community should move beyond surface meaning and embrace implicit semantics as a central modeling goal. Text embedding models have become foundational in modern NLP, powering a wide range of applications and drawing increasing research attention. Yet, much of this progress remains narrowly focused on surface-level semantics. In contrast, linguistic theory emphasizes that meaning is often implicit, shaped by pragmatics, speaker intent, and sociocultural context. Current embedding models are typically trained on data that lacks such depth and evaluated on benchmarks that reward the capture of surface meaning. As a result, they struggle with tasks requiring interpretive reasoning, speaker stance, or social meaning. Our pilot study highlights this gap, showing that even state-of-the-art models perform only marginally better than simplistic baselines on implicit semantics tasks. To address this, we call for a paradigm shift: embedding research should prioritize more diverse and linguistically grounded training data, design benchmarks that evaluate deeper semantic understanding, and explicitly frame implicit meaning as a core modeling objective, better aligning embeddings with real-world language complexity.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

With their increasing size, large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly good at language understanding tasks. But even with high performance on specific downstream task, LLMs fail at simple linguistic tests for negation or quantifier understanding. Previous work on quantifier understanding in LLMs show inverse scaling in understanding few-type quantifiers. In this paper, we question the claims of of previous work and show that it is a result of inappropriate testing methodology. We also present alternate methods to measure quantifier comprehension in LLMs and show that LLMs are able to better understand the difference between the meaning of few-type and most-type quantifiers as their size increases, although they are not particularly good at it. We also observe inverse scaling for most-type quantifier understanding, which is contrary to human psycho-linguistic experiments and previous work, where the model's understanding of most-type quantifier gets worse as the model size increases. We do this evaluation on models ranging from 125M-175B parameters, which suggests that LLMs do not do as well as expected with quantifiers. We also discuss the possible reasons for this and the relevance of quantifier understanding in evaluating language understanding in LLMs.

Natural language reasoning plays an increasingly important role in improving language models' ability to solve complex language understanding tasks. An interesting use case for reasoning is the resolution of context-dependent ambiguity. But no resources exist to evaluate how well Large Language Models can use explicit reasoning to resolve ambiguity in language. We propose to use ambiguous definite descriptions for this purpose and create and publish the first benchmark dataset consisting of such phrases. Our method includes all information required to resolve the ambiguity in the prompt, which means a model does not require anything but reasoning to do well. We find this to be a challenging task for recent LLMs. Code and data available at: https://github.com/sfschouten/exploiting-ambiguity

Effective conversation requires common ground: a shared understanding between the participants. Common ground, however, does not emerge spontaneously in conversation. Speakers and listeners work together to both identify and construct a shared basis while avoiding misunderstanding. To accomplish grounding, humans rely on a range of dialogue acts, like clarification (What do you mean?) and acknowledgment (I understand.). However, it is unclear whether large language models (LLMs) generate text that reflects human grounding. To this end, we curate a set of grounding acts and propose corresponding metrics that quantify attempted grounding. We study whether LLM generations contain grounding acts, simulating turn-taking from several dialogue datasets and comparing results to humans. We find that -- compared to humans -- LLMs generate language with less conversational grounding, instead generating text that appears to simply presume common ground. To understand the roots of the identified grounding gap, we examine the role of instruction tuning and preference optimization, finding that training on contemporary preference data leads to a reduction in generated grounding acts. Altogether, we highlight the need for more research investigating conversational grounding in human-AI interaction.

Every fiscal quarter, companies hold earnings calls in which company executives respond to questions from analysts. After these calls, analysts often change their price target recommendations, which are used in equity research reports to help investors make decisions. In this paper, we examine analysts' decision making behavior as it pertains to the language content of earnings calls. We identify a set of 20 pragmatic features of analysts' questions which we correlate with analysts' pre-call investor recommendations. We also analyze the degree to which semantic and pragmatic features from an earnings call complement market data in predicting analysts' post-call changes in price targets. Our results show that earnings calls are moderately predictive of analysts' decisions even though these decisions are influenced by a number of other factors including private communication with company executives and market conditions. A breakdown of model errors indicates disparate performance on calls from different market sectors.

Successfully handling context is essential for any dialog understanding task. This context maybe be conversational (relying on previous user queries or system responses), visual (relying on what the user sees, for example, on their screen), or background (based on signals such as a ringing alarm or playing music). In this work, we present an overview of MARRS, or Multimodal Reference Resolution System, an on-device framework within a Natural Language Understanding system, responsible for handling conversational, visual and background context. In particular, we present different machine learning models to enable handing contextual queries; specifically, one to enable reference resolution, and one to handle context via query rewriting. We also describe how these models complement each other to form a unified, coherent, lightweight system that can understand context while preserving user privacy.

We introduce CRAFT, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating pragmatic communication in large language models under strict partial information. In this setting, multiple agents with complementary but incomplete views must coordinate through natural language to construct a shared 3D structure that no single agent can fully observe. We formalize this problem as a multi-sender pragmatic reasoning task and provide a diagnostic framework that decomposes failures into spatial grounding, belief modeling and pragmatic communication errors, including a taxonomy of behavioral failure profiles in both frontier and open-weight models. Across a diverse set of models, including 8 open-weight and 7 frontier including reasoning models, we find that stronger reasoning ability does not reliably translate to better coordination: smaller open-weight models often match or outperform frontier systems, and improved individual communication does not guarantee successful collaboration. These results suggest that multi-agent coordination remains a fundamentally unsolved challenge for current language models. Our code can be found at https://github.com/csu-signal/CRAFT

Machine reading comprehension (MRC) is a sub-field in natural language processing that aims to assist computers understand unstructured texts and then answer questions related to them. In practice, the conversation is an essential way to communicate and transfer information. To help machines understand conversation texts, we present UIT-ViCoQA, a new corpus for conversational machine reading comprehension in the Vietnamese language. This corpus consists of 10,000 questions with answers over 2,000 conversations about health news articles. Then, we evaluate several baseline approaches for conversational machine comprehension on the UIT-ViCoQA corpus. The best model obtains an F1 score of 45.27%, which is 30.91 points behind human performance (76.18%), indicating that there is ample room for improvement. Our dataset is available at our website: http://nlp.uit.edu.vn/datasets/ for research purposes.

Physical commonsense reasoning represents a fundamental capability of human intelligence, enabling individuals to understand their environment, predict future events, and navigate physical spaces. Recent years have witnessed growing interest in reasoning tasks within Natural Language Processing (NLP). However, no prior research has examined the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) on non-question-answering (non-QA) physical commonsense reasoning tasks in low-resource languages such as Basque. Taking the Italian GITA as a starting point, this paper addresses this gap by presenting BasPhyCo, the first non-QA physical commonsense reasoning dataset for Basque, available in both standard and dialectal variants. We evaluate model performance across three hierarchical levels of commonsense understanding: (1) distinguishing between plausible and implausible narratives (accuracy), (2) identifying the conflicting element that renders a narrative implausible (consistency), and (3) determining the specific physical state that creates the implausibility (verifiability). These tasks were assessed using multiple multilingual LLMs as well as models pretrained specifically for Italian and Basque. Results indicate that, in terms of verifiability, LLMs exhibit limited physical commonsense capabilities in low-resource languages such as Basque, especially when processing dialectal variants.

A key component of successfully reading a passage of text is the ability to apply knowledge gained from the passage to a new situation. In order to facilitate progress on this kind of reading, we present ROPES, a challenging benchmark for reading comprehension targeting Reasoning Over Paragraph Effects in Situations. We target expository language describing causes and effects (e.g., "animal pollinators increase efficiency of fertilization in flowers"), as they have clear implications for new situations. A system is presented a background passage containing at least one of these relations, a novel situation that uses this background, and questions that require reasoning about effects of the relationships in the background passage in the context of the situation. We collect background passages from science textbooks and Wikipedia that contain such phenomena, and ask crowd workers to author situations, questions, and answers, resulting in a 14,322 question dataset. We analyze the challenges of this task and evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art reading comprehension models. The best model performs only slightly better than randomly guessing an answer of the correct type, at 61.6% F1, well below the human performance of 89.0%.

User queries are often underspecified and may admit multiple valid interpretations. Rather than silently making assumptions about the user's intent, a helpful assistant should surface such ambiguity by asking a clarifying question. Doing so requires two abilities: recognizing that a query is ambiguous, and acting on that recognition by seeking clarification instead of answering directly. To study these abilities, we evaluate models on ambiguous, unambiguous, and disambiguated questions in three settings: standard question answering, explicit ambiguity judgment, and behavioral analysis, where a judge model classifies responses as direct answers, refusals, or clarifying questions. We find a clear gap between recognition and behavior: models often identify ambiguity when explicitly asked to judge it, yet in the QA setting they overwhelmingly default to direct answers. Retrieved context further widens this gap by improving answerability while making models even less likely to ask clarifying questions.

Intent, typically clearly formulated and planned, functions as a cognitive framework for reasoning and problem-solving. This paper introduces the concept of Speaking with Intent (SWI) in large language models (LLMs), where the explicitly generated intent encapsulates the model's underlying intention and provides high-level planning to guide subsequent analysis and communication. By emulating deliberate and purposeful thoughts in the human mind, SWI is hypothesized to enhance the reasoning capabilities and generation quality of LLMs. Extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks consistently demonstrate the superiority of Speaking with Intent over Baseline (i.e., generation without explicit intent). Moreover, SWI outperforms answer-trigger prompting methods Chain-of-Thought and Plan-and-Solve and maintains competitive performance with the strong method ARR (Analyzing, Retrieving, and Reasoning). Additionally, the effectiveness and generalizability of SWI are solidified on reasoning-intensive question answering (QA) and text summarization benchmarks, where SWI brings consistent improvement to the Baseline generation. In text summarization, SWI-generated summaries exhibit greater accuracy, conciseness, and factual correctness, with fewer hallucinations. Furthermore, human evaluations verify the coherence, effectiveness, and interpretability of the intent produced by SWI. This proof-of-concept study creates a novel avenue for enhancing LLMs' reasoning abilities with cognitive notions.

Social interactions form the foundation of human societies. Artificial intelligence has made significant progress in certain areas, but enabling machines to seamlessly understand social interactions remains an open challenge. It is important to address this gap by endowing machines with social capabilities. We identify three key capabilities needed for effective social understanding: 1) understanding multimodal social cues, 2) understanding multi-party dynamics, and 3) understanding beliefs. Building upon these foundations, we classify and review existing machine learning works on social understanding from the perspectives of verbal, non-verbal, and multimodal social cues. The verbal branch focuses on understanding linguistic signals such as speaker intent, dialogue sentiment, and commonsense reasoning. The non-verbal branch addresses techniques for perceiving social meaning from visual behaviors such as body gestures, gaze patterns, and facial expressions. The multimodal branch covers approaches that integrate verbal and non-verbal multimodal cues to holistically interpret social interactions such as recognizing emotions, conversational dynamics, and social situations. By reviewing the scope and limitations of current approaches and benchmarks, we aim to clarify the development trajectory and illuminate the path towards more comprehensive intelligence for social understanding. We hope this survey will spur further research interest and insights into this area.

Representation and learning of commonsense knowledge is one of the foundational problems in the quest to enable deep language understanding. This issue is particularly challenging for understanding casual and correlational relationships between events. While this topic has received a lot of interest in the NLP community, research has been hindered by the lack of a proper evaluation framework. This paper attempts to address this problem with a new framework for evaluating story understanding and script learning: the 'Story Cloze Test'. This test requires a system to choose the correct ending to a four-sentence story. We created a new corpus of ~50k five-sentence commonsense stories, ROCStories, to enable this evaluation. This corpus is unique in two ways: (1) it captures a rich set of causal and temporal commonsense relations between daily events, and (2) it is a high quality collection of everyday life stories that can also be used for story generation. Experimental evaluation shows that a host of baselines and state-of-the-art models based on shallow language understanding struggle to achieve a high score on the Story Cloze Test. We discuss these implications for script and story learning, and offer suggestions for deeper language understanding.

Prior approaches to realizing mixed-initiative human--computer referential communication have adopted information-state or collaborative problem-solving approaches. In this paper, we argue for a new approach, inspired by coherence-based models of discourse such as SDRT asher-lascarides:2003a, in which utterances attach to an evolving discourse structure and the associated knowledge graph of speaker commitments serves as an interface to real-world reasoning and conversational strategy. As first steps towards implementing the approach, we describe a simple dialogue system in a referential communication domain that accumulates constraints across discourse, interprets them using a learned probabilistic model, and plans clarification using reinforcement learning.

Empathy is a complex cognitive ability based on the reasoning of others' affective states. In order to better understand others and express stronger empathy in dialogues, we argue that two issues must be tackled at the same time: (i) identifying which word is the cause for the other's emotion from his or her utterance and (ii) reflecting those specific words in the response generation. However, previous approaches for recognizing emotion cause words in text require sub-utterance level annotations, which can be demanding. Taking inspiration from social cognition, we leverage a generative estimator to infer emotion cause words from utterances with no word-level label. Also, we introduce a novel method based on pragmatics to make dialogue models focus on targeted words in the input during generation. Our method is applicable to any dialogue models with no additional training on the fly. We show our approach improves multiple best-performing dialogue agents on generating more focused empathetic responses in terms of both automatic and human evaluation.

To apply eyeshadow without a brush, should I use a cotton swab or a toothpick? Questions requiring this kind of physical commonsense pose a challenge to today's natural language understanding systems. While recent pretrained models (such as BERT) have made progress on question answering over more abstract domains - such as news articles and encyclopedia entries, where text is plentiful - in more physical domains, text is inherently limited due to reporting bias. Can AI systems learn to reliably answer physical common-sense questions without experiencing the physical world? In this paper, we introduce the task of physical commonsense reasoning and a corresponding benchmark dataset Physical Interaction: Question Answering or PIQA. Though humans find the dataset easy (95% accuracy), large pretrained models struggle (77%). We provide analysis about the dimensions of knowledge that existing models lack, which offers significant opportunities for future research.

Recently developed large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform remarkably well on a wide range of language understanding tasks. But, can they really "reason" over the natural language? This question has been receiving significant research attention and many reasoning skills such as commonsense, numerical, and qualitative have been studied. However, the crucial skill pertaining to 'logical reasoning' has remained underexplored. Existing work investigating this reasoning ability of LLMs has focused only on a couple of inference rules (such as modus ponens and modus tollens) of propositional and first-order logic. Addressing the above limitation, we comprehensively evaluate the logical reasoning ability of LLMs on 25 different reasoning patterns spanning over propositional, first-order, and non-monotonic logics. To enable systematic evaluation, we introduce LogicBench, a natural language question-answering dataset focusing on the use of a single inference rule. We conduct detailed analysis with a range of LLMs such as GPT-4, ChatGPT, Gemini, Llama-2, and Mistral using chain-of-thought prompting. Experimental results show that existing LLMs do not fare well on LogicBench; especially, they struggle with instances involving complex reasoning and negations. Furthermore, they sometimes overlook contextual information necessary for reasoning to arrive at the correct conclusion. We believe that our work and findings facilitate future research for evaluating and enhancing the logical reasoning ability of LLMs. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Mihir3009/LogicBench.

Commonsense reasoning is a critical AI capability, but it is difficult to construct challenging datasets that test common sense. Recent neural question answering systems, based on large pre-trained models of language, have already achieved near-human-level performance on commonsense knowledge benchmarks. These systems do not possess human-level common sense, but are able to exploit limitations of the datasets to achieve human-level scores. We introduce the CODAH dataset, an adversarially-constructed evaluation dataset for testing common sense. CODAH forms a challenging extension to the recently-proposed SWAG dataset, which tests commonsense knowledge using sentence-completion questions that describe situations observed in video. To produce a more difficult dataset, we introduce a novel procedure for question acquisition in which workers author questions designed to target weaknesses of state-of-the-art neural question answering systems. Workers are rewarded for submissions that models fail to answer correctly both before and after fine-tuning (in cross-validation). We create 2.8k questions via this procedure and evaluate the performance of multiple state-of-the-art question answering systems on our dataset. We observe a significant gap between human performance, which is 95.3%, and the performance of the best baseline accuracy of 67.5% by the BERT-Large model.

This paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in metaphor interpretation across multiple datasets, tasks, and prompt configurations. Although metaphor processing has gained significant attention in Natural Language Processing (NLP), previous research has been limited to single-dataset evaluations and specific task settings, often using artificially constructed data through lexical replacement. We address these limitations by conducting extensive experiments using diverse publicly available datasets with inference and metaphor annotations, focusing on Natural Language Inference (NLI) and Question Answering (QA) tasks. The results indicate that LLMs' performance is more influenced by features like lexical overlap and sentence length than by metaphorical content, demonstrating that any alleged emergent abilities of LLMs to understand metaphorical language are the result of a combination of surface-level features, in-context learning, and linguistic knowledge. This work provides critical insights into the current capabilities and limitations of LLMs in processing figurative language, highlighting the need for more realistic evaluation frameworks in metaphor interpretation tasks. Data and code are publicly available.

Captioning is a crucial and challenging task for video understanding. In videos that involve active agents such as humans, the agent's actions can bring about myriad changes in the scene. Observable changes such as movements, manipulations, and transformations of the objects in the scene, are reflected in conventional video captioning. Unlike images, actions in videos are also inherently linked to social aspects such as intentions (why the action is taking place), effects (what changes due to the action), and attributes that describe the agent. Thus for video understanding, such as when captioning videos or when answering questions about videos, one must have an understanding of these commonsense aspects. We present the first work on generating commonsense captions directly from videos, to describe latent aspects such as intentions, effects, and attributes. We present a new dataset "Video-to-Commonsense (V2C)" that contains sim9k videos of human agents performing various actions, annotated with 3 types of commonsense descriptions. Additionally we explore the use of open-ended video-based commonsense question answering (V2C-QA) as a way to enrich our captions. Both the generation task and the QA task can be used to enrich video captions.

Large language models (LLMs) are regularly evaluated using benchmark datasets. But what justifies making inferences about an LLM's capabilities based on its answers to a curated set of questions? This paper first introduces a formal framework to address this question. The key is to note that the benchmarks used to test LLMs -- such as AP exams -- are also those used to test people. However, this raises an implication: these benchmarks are only valid tests if LLMs misunderstand concepts in ways that mirror human misunderstandings. Otherwise, success on benchmarks only demonstrates potemkin understanding: the illusion of understanding driven by answers irreconcilable with how any human would interpret a concept. We present two procedures for quantifying the existence of potemkins: one using a specially designed benchmark in three domains, the other using a general procedure that provides a lower-bound on their prevalence. We find that potemkins are ubiquitous across models, tasks, and domains. We also find that these failures reflect not just incorrect understanding, but deeper internal incoherence in concept representations.

Given the growing importance of AI literacy, we decided to write this tutorial to help narrow the gap between the discourse among those who study language models -- the core technology underlying ChatGPT and similar products -- and those who are intrigued and want to learn more about them. In short, we believe the perspective of researchers and educators can add some clarity to the public's understanding of the technologies beyond what's currently available, which tends to be either extremely technical or promotional material generated about products by their purveyors. Our approach teases apart the concept of a language model from products built on them, from the behaviors attributed to or desired from those products, and from claims about similarity to human cognition. As a starting point, we (1) offer a scientific viewpoint that focuses on questions amenable to study through experimentation; (2) situate language models as they are today in the context of the research that led to their development; and (3) describe the boundaries of what is known about the models at this writing.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

We survey a current, heated debate in the AI research community on whether large pre-trained language models can be said to "understand" language -- and the physical and social situations language encodes -- in any important sense. We describe arguments that have been made for and against such understanding, and key questions for the broader sciences of intelligence that have arisen in light of these arguments. We contend that a new science of intelligence can be developed that will provide insight into distinct modes of understanding, their strengths and limitations, and the challenge of integrating diverse forms of cognition.

The ability to perform complex reasoning across multimodal inputs is essential for models to effectively interact with humans in real-world scenarios. Advancements in vision-language models have significantly improved performance on tasks that require processing explicit and direct textual inputs, such as Visual Question Answering (VQA) and Visual Grounding (VG). However, less attention has been given to improving the model capabilities to comprehend nuanced and ambiguous forms of communication. This presents a critical challenge, as human language in real-world interactions often convey hidden intentions that rely on context for accurate interpretation. To address this gap, we propose VAGUE, a multimodal benchmark comprising 3.9K indirect human utterances paired with corresponding scenes. Additionally, we contribute a model-based pipeline for generating prompt-solution pairs from input images. Our work aims to delve deeper into the ability of models to understand indirect communication and seek to contribute to the development of models capable of more refined and human-like interactions. Extensive evaluation on multiple VLMs reveals that mainstream models still struggle with indirect communication when required to perform complex linguistic and visual reasoning. We release our code and data at https://github.com/Hazel-Heejeong-Nam/VAGUE.git.

Language model representations often contain linear directions that correspond to high-level concepts. Here, we study the dynamics of these representations: how representations evolve along these dimensions within the context of (simulated) conversations. We find that linear representations can change dramatically over a conversation; for example, information that is represented as factual at the beginning of a conversation can be represented as non-factual at the end and vice versa. These changes are content-dependent; while representations of conversation-relevant information may change, generic information is generally preserved. These changes are robust even for dimensions that disentangle factuality from more superficial response patterns, and occur across different model families and layers of the model. These representation changes do not require on-policy conversations; even replaying a conversation script written by an entirely different model can produce similar changes. However, adaptation is much weaker from simply having a sci-fi story in context that is framed more explicitly as such. We also show that steering along a representational direction can have dramatically different effects at different points in a conversation. These results are consistent with the idea that representations may evolve in response to the model playing a particular role that is cued by a conversation. Our findings may pose challenges for interpretability and steering -- in particular, they imply that it may be misleading to use static interpretations of features or directions, or probes that assume a particular range of features consistently corresponds to a particular ground-truth value. However, these types of representational dynamics also point to exciting new research directions for understanding how models adapt to context.

In this article, we use probing to investigate phenomena that occur during fine-tuning and knowledge distillation of a BERT-based natural language understanding (NLU) model. Our ultimate purpose was to use probing to better understand practical production problems and consequently to build better NLU models. We designed experiments to see how fine-tuning changes the linguistic capabilities of BERT, what the optimal size of the fine-tuning dataset is, and what amount of information is contained in a distilled NLU based on a tiny Transformer. The results of the experiments show that the probing paradigm in its current form is not well suited to answer such questions. Structural, Edge and Conditional probes do not take into account how easy it is to decode probed information. Consequently, we conclude that quantification of information decodability is critical for many practical applications of the probing paradigm.

Large language models (LLMs) have been widely applied in various fields due to their excellent capability for memorizing knowledge and chain of thought (CoT). When these language models are applied in the field of psychological counseling, they often rush to provide universal advice. However, when users seek psychological support, they need to gain empathy, trust, understanding and comfort, rather than just reasonable advice. To this end, we constructed a multi-turn empathetic conversation dataset of more than 2 million samples, in which the input is the multi-turn conversation context, and the target is empathetic responses that cover expressions such as questioning, comfort, recognition, listening, trust, emotional support, etc. Experiments have shown that the empathy ability of LLMs can be significantly enhanced when finetuning by using multi-turn dialogue history and responses that are closer to the expression of a psychological consultant.

We present a generalizable classification approach that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to facilitate the detection of implicitly encoded social meaning in conversations. We design a multi-faceted prompt to extract a textual explanation of the reasoning that connects visible cues to underlying social meanings. These extracted explanations or rationales serve as augmentations to the conversational text to facilitate dialogue understanding and transfer. Our empirical results over 2,340 experimental settings demonstrate the significant positive impact of adding these rationales. Our findings hold true for in-domain classification, zero-shot, and few-shot domain transfer for two different social meaning detection tasks, each spanning two different corpora.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are highly proficient in language-based tasks. Their language capabilities have positioned them at the forefront of the future AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) race. However, on closer inspection, Valmeekam et al. (2024); Zecevic et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2024) highlight a significant gap between their language proficiency and reasoning abilities. Reasoning in LLMs and Vision Language Models (VLMs) aims to bridge this gap by enabling these models to think and re-evaluate their actions and responses. Reasoning is an essential capability for complex problem-solving and a necessary step toward establishing trust in Artificial Intelligence (AI). This will make AI suitable for deployment in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, banking, law, defense, security etc. In recent times, with the advent of powerful reasoning models like OpenAI O1 and DeepSeek R1, reasoning endowment has become a critical research topic in LLMs. In this paper, we provide a detailed overview and comparison of existing reasoning techniques and present a systematic survey of reasoning-imbued language models. We also study current challenges and present our findings.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

People often give instructions whose meaning is ambiguous without further context, expecting that their actions or goals will disambiguate their intentions. How can we build assistive agents that follow such instructions in a flexible, context-sensitive manner? This paper introduces cooperative language-guided inverse plan search (CLIPS), a Bayesian agent architecture for pragmatic instruction following and goal assistance. Our agent assists a human by modeling them as a cooperative planner who communicates joint plans to the assistant, then performs multimodal Bayesian inference over the human's goal from actions and language, using large language models (LLMs) to evaluate the likelihood of an instruction given a hypothesized plan. Given this posterior, our assistant acts to minimize expected goal achievement cost, enabling it to pragmatically follow ambiguous instructions and provide effective assistance even when uncertain about the goal. We evaluate these capabilities in two cooperative planning domains (Doors, Keys & Gems and VirtualHome), finding that CLIPS significantly outperforms GPT-4V, LLM-based literal instruction following and unimodal inverse planning in both accuracy and helpfulness, while closely matching the inferences and assistive judgments provided by human raters.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

We argue that enabling human-AI dialogue, purposed to support joint reasoning (i.e., 'inquiry'), is important for ensuring that AI decision making is aligned with human values and preferences. In particular, we point to logic-based models of argumentation and dialogue, and suggest that the traditional focus on persuasion dialogues be replaced by a focus on inquiry dialogues, and the distinct challenges that joint inquiry raises. Given recent dramatic advances in the performance of large language models (LLMs), and the anticipated increase in their use for decision making, we provide a roadmap for research into inquiry dialogues for supporting joint human-LLM reasoning tasks that are ethically salient, and that thereby require that decisions are value aligned.

Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such as how models copy or recall factual knowledge. In this work, we propose a formulation of competition of mechanisms, which focuses on the interplay of multiple mechanisms instead of individual mechanisms and traces how one of them becomes dominant in the final prediction. We uncover how and where mechanisms compete within LLMs using two interpretability methods: logit inspection and attention modification. Our findings show traces of the mechanisms and their competition across various model components and reveal attention positions that effectively control the strength of certain mechanisms. Code: https://github.com/francescortu/comp-mech. Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/francescortu/comp-mech.

Enhancing AI systems with efficient communication skills for effective human assistance necessitates proactive initiatives from the system side to discern specific circumstances and interact aptly. This research focuses on a collective building assignment in the Minecraft dataset, employing language modeling to enhance task understanding through state-of-the-art methods. These models focus on grounding multi-modal understanding and task-oriented dialogue comprehension tasks, providing insights into their interpretative and responsive capabilities. Our experimental results showcase a substantial improvement over existing methods, indicating a promising direction for future research in this domain.

Many commonsense reasoning NLP tasks involve choosing between one or more possible answers to a question or prompt based on knowledge that is often implicit. Large pretrained language models (PLMs) can achieve near-human performance on such tasks, while providing little human-interpretable evidence of the underlying reasoning they use. In this work, we show how to use these same models to generate such evidence: inspired by the contrastive nature of human explanations, we use PLMs to complete explanation prompts which contrast alternatives according to the key attribute(s) required to justify the correct answer (for example, peanuts are usually salty while raisins are sweet). Conditioning model decisions on these explanations improves performance on two commonsense reasoning benchmarks, as compared to previous non-contrastive alternatives. These explanations are also judged by humans to be more relevant for solving the task, and facilitate a novel method to evaluate explanation faithfulfness.

A prominent challenge for modern language understanding systems is the ability to answer implicit reasoning questions, where the required reasoning steps for answering the question are not mentioned in the text explicitly. In this work, we investigate why current models struggle with implicit reasoning question answering (QA) tasks, by decoupling inference of reasoning steps from their execution. We define a new task of implicit relation inference and construct a benchmark, IMPLICITRELATIONS, where given a question, a model should output a list of concept-relation pairs, where the relations describe the implicit reasoning steps required for answering the question. Using IMPLICITRELATIONS, we evaluate models from the GPT-3 family and find that, while these models struggle on the implicit reasoning QA task, they often succeed at inferring implicit relations. This suggests that the challenge in implicit reasoning questions does not stem from the need to plan a reasoning strategy alone, but to do it while also retrieving and reasoning over relevant information.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

Misunderstandings arise not only in interpersonal communication but also between humans and Large Language Models (LLMs). Such discrepancies can make LLMs interpret seemingly unambiguous questions in unexpected ways, yielding incorrect responses. While it is widely acknowledged that the quality of a prompt, such as a question, significantly impacts the quality of the response provided by LLMs, a systematic method for crafting questions that LLMs can better comprehend is still underdeveloped. In this paper, we present a method named `Rephrase and Respond' (RaR), which allows LLMs to rephrase and expand questions posed by humans and provide responses in a single prompt. This approach serves as a simple yet effective prompting method for improving performance. We also introduce a two-step variant of RaR, where a rephrasing LLM first rephrases the question and then passes the original and rephrased questions together to a different responding LLM. This facilitates the effective utilization of rephrased questions generated by one LLM with another. Our experiments demonstrate that our methods significantly improve the performance of different models across a wide range to tasks. We further provide a comprehensive comparison between RaR and the popular Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methods, both theoretically and empirically. We show that RaR is complementary to CoT and can be combined with CoT to achieve even better performance. Our work not only contributes to enhancing LLM performance efficiently and effectively but also sheds light on a fair evaluation of LLM capabilities. Data and codes are available at https://github.com/uclaml/Rephrase-and-Respond.

Enabling a computer to understand a document so that it can answer comprehension questions is a central, yet unsolved goal of NLP. A key factor impeding its solution by machine learned systems is the limited availability of human-annotated data. Hermann et al. (2015) seek to solve this problem by creating over a million training examples by pairing CNN and Daily Mail news articles with their summarized bullet points, and show that a neural network can then be trained to give good performance on this task. In this paper, we conduct a thorough examination of this new reading comprehension task. Our primary aim is to understand what depth of language understanding is required to do well on this task. We approach this from one side by doing a careful hand-analysis of a small subset of the problems and from the other by showing that simple, carefully designed systems can obtain accuracies of 73.6% and 76.6% on these two datasets, exceeding current state-of-the-art results by 7-10% and approaching what we believe is the ceiling for performance on this task.

Figurative language (e.g., "he flew like the wind") is challenging to understand, as it is hard to tell what implicit information is being conveyed from the surface form alone. We hypothesize that to perform this task well, the reader needs to mentally elaborate the scene being described to identify a sensible meaning of the language. We present DREAM-FLUTE, a figurative language understanding system that does this, first forming a "mental model" of situations described in a premise and hypothesis before making an entailment/contradiction decision and generating an explanation. DREAM-FLUTE uses an existing scene elaboration model, DREAM, for constructing its "mental model." In the FigLang2022 Shared Task evaluation, DREAM-FLUTE achieved (joint) first place (Acc@60=63.3%), and can perform even better with ensemble techniques, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach. More generally, this work suggests that adding a reflective component to pretrained language models can improve their performance beyond standard fine-tuning (3.3% improvement in Acc@60).

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

How does language inform our downstream thinking? In particular, how do humans make meaning from language -- and how can we leverage a theory of linguistic meaning to build machines that think in more human-like ways? In this paper, we propose rational meaning construction, a computational framework for language-informed thinking that combines neural models of language with probabilistic models for rational inference. We frame linguistic meaning as a context-sensitive mapping from natural language into a probabilistic language of thought (PLoT) -- a general-purpose symbolic substrate for probabilistic, generative world modeling. Our architecture integrates two powerful computational tools that have not previously come together: we model thinking with probabilistic programs, an expressive representation for flexible commonsense reasoning; and we model meaning construction with large language models (LLMs), which support broad-coverage translation from natural language utterances to code expressions in a probabilistic programming language. We illustrate our framework in action through examples covering four core domains from cognitive science: probabilistic reasoning, logical and relational reasoning, visual and physical reasoning, and social reasoning about agents and their plans. In each, we show that LLMs can generate context-sensitive translations that capture pragmatically-appropriate linguistic meanings, while Bayesian inference with the generated programs supports coherent and robust commonsense reasoning. We extend our framework to integrate cognitively-motivated symbolic modules to provide a unified commonsense thinking interface from language. Finally, we explore how language can drive the construction of world models themselves.

In collaborative dialogue, shared perception does not guarantee shared interpretation. Mutual understanding must be established through interaction. We investigate whether vision-language models (VLMs) can distinguish what could be shared from what has been shared between dialogue participants through grounding. We formulate this as an interpretation-matching task on 13,077 annotated reference expressions from HCRC MapTask dialogues, and evaluate VLMs under systematically controlled manipulations of dialogue context and map-information access. Our results show that providing authentic map images improves overall performance but shifts models toward over-predicting alignment. Textual descriptions of the same map content reproduce this bias, while non-informative images suppress alignment predictions entirely, indicating that the bias is driven by task-relevant map content, not the visual channel. This improvement comes at the cost of degraded accuracy on non-aligned cases. Calibration analysis and reference-chain tracking further suggest that models rely on static referential cues on the maps rather than tracking how grounding unfolds through dialogue history. We observe these patterns most clearly in Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct and, to varying degrees, in four additional models from two architecture families. In models that exhibit the bias, map content, whether presented visually or textually, is treated as evidence of mutual understanding, conflating potential with established common ground.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

For natural language understanding (NLU) technology to be maximally useful, both practically and as a scientific object of study, it must be general: it must be able to process language in a way that is not exclusively tailored to any one specific task or dataset. In pursuit of this objective, we introduce the General Language Understanding Evaluation benchmark (GLUE), a tool for evaluating and analyzing the performance of models across a diverse range of existing NLU tasks. GLUE is model-agnostic, but it incentivizes sharing knowledge across tasks because certain tasks have very limited training data. We further provide a hand-crafted diagnostic test suite that enables detailed linguistic analysis of NLU models. We evaluate baselines based on current methods for multi-task and transfer learning and find that they do not immediately give substantial improvements over the aggregate performance of training a separate model per task, indicating room for improvement in developing general and robust NLU systems.

In Spoken Language Understanding (SLU) the task is to extract important information from audio commands, like the intent of what a user wants the system to do and special entities like locations or numbers. This paper presents a simple method for embedding intents and entities into Finite State Transducers, and, in combination with a pretrained general-purpose Speech-to-Text model, allows building SLU-models without any additional training. Building those models is very fast and only takes a few seconds. It is also completely language independent. With a comparison on different benchmarks it is shown that this method can outperform multiple other, more resource demanding SLU approaches.